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preface. 
Statesmanship is a noble and difficult art and it is rare. And to criticize 
or complain about the conduct of public affairs is of course easy. It 
is not becoming in a philosopher who has learned from Plato and Spinoza 
that "all noble things are as difficult as they are rare" to pretend rashly 
to know better than those charged with such heavy responsibilities of 
state and daily engaged in negotiations involving military, economic and 
political power as well as the imponderables of opinion and belief. It is 
also well to remember Machiavelli7s observation: "Fortune is the arbiter 
of one half of our actions . . . she leaves us to direct the other half, or 
perhaps a little less."l Even virth supreme may be defeated by circum- 
stances. We should not in a superior, self-righteous manner lay any 
failure, then, simply to the faults of particular men or governments. 
Yet in our present democratic world it is permissible, even the duty 
of any one in any nation whose life and prospects of well-being or 
ill are subject to the train of consequences that follow from acts of gov- 
ernment and diplomacy to speak out when things seem wrong or bad. 
And in such a situation, it may well be the office of a citizen devoted to 
philosophy to examine the frame of ideas in terms of which the diploma- 
tists and politicians speak to each other and to the world and formulate 
their hoped-for settlements. Sometimes the troubles do come from a pov- 
erty of ideas, or it may even be from a lack of coherence in them which 
prevents any consistent policy from being attainable and in such situa- 
tions the services of philosophers can surely be of some use. 
1.  The Case that Raised the Question of  this Paper: 
The Suez Canal Affair. 
What is here to be presented as a subject for discussion is occasioned 
by the Suez Canal imbroglio of recent occurrence. Three civilized na- 
tions in the pursuance of their rights have employed force against Egypt 
and left a blemish on their great records. There was young Israel seeking 
to secure her very existence, itself so unwelcome and intolerable to her 
neighbors and they themselves will allow of no possibility of peace, and 
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so a state of belligerency is thrust upon Israel willy-nilly and used as 
a ground for debarment from what had been an "international" waterway. 
Along with Israel, or at least acting at the same time, were France, so 
long a leader in civilization and culture, and Britain, the modern 
school for political freedom under law, these two old states high in honor, 
They took their military action and entered the land of Egypt. Yet one 
fine day or so they all "folded up their tents and silently stole away." 
What made the victors do this, retreating from the positions of van- 
tage which they had gained? That may not be so easy to answer in a 
few superficial words. More than meets the eye is involved, along with 
the public reasons. Thus we may hear it said, for instance, that Russia 
had growled with an ominous threat. The United States of America 
openly showed disapproval, together with some resentment at not being 
consulted. The United Nations voiced the general demand that member 
nations must not cope with a unilateral abrogation of conventions in that 
aggressive fashion but ought to proceed through the proper agencies 
of peaceful solution. There was a suspicion, too, that the states inter- 
ested in the Suez company's claim had tried to effect a fait accornpli 
that would alter the situation several years hence when the Canal was 
due to revert to Egypt. In such confusion of hidden purposes and an- 
nounced policies, and seeing the obvious danger of a war in the Middle 
East which could bring on a total world war, the onlooker nations had 
somehow called a halt, and their words had been heeded. 
2. The Question Concerns Sovereigizty. 
I t  is at this constructive juncture that the doubts and questionings 
arise concerning the quality of our contemporary statesmanship. The diplo- 
mats of the West seem always to be at the mercy of situations others 
have created. They improvise for each such occasion: now a user's as- 
sociation and virtual boycott, then payment under protest to obdurate 
Egypt. There is also a troubleshooter from the United States wandering 
amid the foreign offices of the Arab nations in hopes of making friends 
and influencing people. Here helpless drift is all one sees, and no 
real settlement in prospect. Nothing has resulted except bulletins of re- 
assuring words of comfort that all will be well, but nothing is proposed 
that will bring the nations together under the rule of law. We are still 
waiting for a policy, one course of action with some kind of unified 
aim and showing the proximate, logical, practical steps toward the ulti- 
mate goal of an international order with the semblance of mutual security 
and freedom with justice. There is, however, one special troubling out- 
come of this whole affair, namely, that the "sovereignty" of Egypt over 
the Canal has been accepted and vindicated. Only this and nothing more, 
nothing about the paramount authority of the United Nations or of any 
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law above the nations under whose rule they must conduct their affairs 
and dealings with each other. All the governments concerned have had 
to bow before the sacred character of the sovereignty of one nation. 
They have not challenged the idea or even said in reference to sover- 
eignty what it means or entails. In granting that Egypt has sovereignty 
they have recognized mere possession as true property, without looking 
into the title. They have conferred a benefit for a previous violation 
of a convention and they have tied their hands so that they cannot 
put law above sovereignty, and all this is a very great evil. 
3.  A Profession of  Faith. 
I have passed a judgment here. Before going on to the properly phi- 
Iosophical part of this presentation let me confess the full content of my 
convictions. I t  is my belief that in thus bowing and scraping defer- 
entially before sovereignty-I mean national sovereignty, and this ap- 
plies to any nation whatsoever-the politicians and lawyers of the present 
age are condemning us to still further reversions from peace and a de- 
cent civilization. I have taken the Suez Canal case only as an illustra- 
tion and may have misjudged and misrepresented it. Let it be treated as 
a fiction, then, or a myth. The point I want to bring out is that the fea- 
turing of the sovereignty of any state as untouchable and absolute so 
that one cannot argue about its competence or propose limitations is con- 
trary to the philosophy of the "republic" which I hold to be the only 
foundation for civilized existence. The idea of "republic" includes a num- 
ber of ideas with which the idea of sovereignty is in opposition. This 
contrariety among the ideas that are essential stock in the trade of poli- 
tics can be one cause for the failures of the policies of great powers 
from which we are suffering. I believe that we must commit ourselves 
steadily to the republic-idea and do all that it requires of us or else per- 
ish. So much for the profession of faith. 
4. Concerning "Ideas," 
Every idea long acceptable and valuable in the experience of people 
is more than a single concept. It  has first some original intent, and then 
it develops a set of essential meanings which are logically and em- 
pirically connected. When the term is used that refers to this schematic 
idea i t  may actually call up the thought of only a part of the system 
but more is entailed, and sooner or later it may come to light. One may 
recall here what Immanuel Kant said about the meaning of "idea" in 
Plato, and the idea of the "republic" as an The actual employ- 
ment of any "idea" from time to time in history results also in certain 
historical associations which become adherent to its meaning and these 
may be as influential and important and fateful as the original sense. One 
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can say, therefore, of the idea of republic as well as that of sovereignty 
what Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes said of liberty in an opinion of 
the Supreme Court: "Liberty in each of its phases has a history and a 
co~otation." 
5. The Vogue of the Title "Republic" and Its Connotation. 
Nearly all the nations of the world today are committed, by their own 
profession, to the political system of a republic or commonwealth. They 
have assumed the title and glory in it. It is an interesting historical phe- 
nomenon that during the past two centuries republics have come into such 
vogue. Besides the first republics of North, Central and South America 
and France, new ones, both large and small, have been established in 
Europe, Asia, and Africa. The fact that there is a Republic of China 
and a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shows that the idea has 
ubiquitous appeal across all ideological lines. 
The connotation of "republic" in this present phase is largely de- 
termined by the American precedents. The colonists of British North 
America founded their republic, with help from France and Spain, and after 
a war for independence, from empire. They represented their cause as 
just before the rest of the world in immortal documents and claimed that 
the remote government in London had utterly disregarded the principles 
of free government, namely, the welfare of those governed and their 
rights and liberties. Liberated as a United States of America these peo- 
ple set up their own institutions, beginning with a constitution defining 
and limiting the powers of any subsequent government for the Ameri- 
can nation. Meanwhile the French Revolution occurred, a throwing off 
by the people of the intolerable yoke of their own government. The Re- 
publics of Ibero America were a close sequel revealing to the world that 
the idea of republic was not limited in meaning and value to peoples 
of British and French extraction but was viable for nations of other stocks 
and traditions and cultures. And all these republics were established with 
difficulty and in thc teeth of greater power elsewhere which might at 
any time conspire to wipe them off the face of the earth. With their 
hardy survival and dramatic success the name "republic" is histori- 
cally associated. 
So for many years, as nations have developed strength and integrity 
within former empire and revolted or freed themselves, they have as- 
sumed this proud title of republic. It signifies liberation from domina- 
tion and an autonomy or self-government and dedication to the principle 
that the proper object of all government is the general good. Usually, 
too, conditions have been established defining and limiting powers of 
government in the interest of personal liberty. This is the connotation 
of republic in its recent phase. 
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6. The 18th Century American Version: the Republic with 
Personal Liberty. 
The idea which has thus entered into modem civilization is of course 
ancient, and everyone naturally thinks of the delineation in the Republic 
of Plato. I t  is well to recall the speculative daring of philosophy in those 
days, and how the exemplar Socrates set out bravely to explore, in the 
face of ridicule, the sheer possibilities of the idea which ran far be- 
yond any actual reality and even to sketch a whole order of society 
where the ideal might be completely realized. Though the scheme as a 
whole has seemed ever Utopian, parts of it have more than once been 
appropriated with remarkable effect. And an instance was the founding 
of the first American republic. The statesmen of that epoch worked 
from a pattern of republic which was mediated to them through Locke, 
Hume, and Montesquieu. Indeed, Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws was 
a remarkably fertile reinterpretation of the Greek view of community and 
politics as applying to many types of historical situation vastly distant 
from anything contemplated by Plato and Aristotle. Inspired by such "re- 
publican" phiIosophy, the Americans then achieved their own original 
adaptation of the idea. "Republican government" to them meant not only 
adopting the central proposition of the Platonic politics, viz., that the 
general good shall always be the end of government, but also introduc- 
ing the modern and "democratical" proposition that the people themselves 
must be represented in the government so as to be able to determine 
the laws and policies that in their opinion best serve the welfare of 
the nation. Thus provision for personal liberty was welded into the tra- 
ditional form of the republic. 
7. The Original Platonic Pattern in Review. 
Immensely viable as this eighteenth century version has been, it should 
not be assumed to exhaust the possibilities of the republic-idea, The civil- 
ized world, organized in part, at least, according to such "republican princi- 
ples," is now in dire straits and in need of a redeeming policy and we 
might profitably consult the original speculative pattern once again and 
try again, too, to put philosophy into good practice. 
Let us consult, then, or better, review the scheme sketched by Plato. 
The first intention is to counter an evil pervading all parts of human 
society, viz.; the Thrasymachus spirit and its sophistry: Power is not only 
its own law but it also imposes upon those subject to it, "the weaker," 
a belief that this is right. In actual fact such imposition can hardly suc- 
ceed for long at a time simply because "justice" really is by "nature" 
something different from whatever merely prevails, and men even with- 
out philosophy do discover a real distinction between right and might. 
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That these are two things is matter of common experience, for life in 
society involves some reference both to justice and to force. There is 
then no reducing of one to the other. I t  is for the philosopher and the 
statesman instead to work out a rationale of both as realities that men 
must live by. 
Power Harmonized with Justice: The First Intention of  the Republic. 
This harmonious order was not the peculiar dream of Socrates. It was 
writ large repeatedly in those various wonderful vehicles of Greek cul- 
ture, the drama, the sculptured frieze, the reported counsels of the Del- 
phic oracle, the celebrations of the Olympic games, as well as in his- 
tories and philosophies. It  was sung early in the verse of Solon, the 
revered lawgiver of Athens who gloried in what he had done, in these 
words : 
"I liberated them. And through my power 
With force and justice in true harmony, 
I did the work."' 
In  the Greek spirit, then, the primary intention of the Republic written 
by Plato is to show that force must be harnessed with justice and never 
allowed to run rampant into injustice. 
Law Supreme-Justice. 
With law-giving in mind (the Solon gift), it must be said of course, 
that governments make laws, too, and they order thereby the affairs of 
the State, but these positive laws are something other than the supreme 
rule governing the exercise of power. This supreme law or justice is not 
something to be manipulated by rulers according to their arbitrary judg- 
ment or will and it is, indeed, by reference to Law in that eminent 
form that particular laws are judged to merit the name and authority 
of law. 
Harmonizing Self-Interest and the Commonweal in some Identity. 
A second stipulation appears in the consideration of the actual situa- 
tion as respects the government of men, a situation which the Greeks 
faced no less realistically than Hobbes was to do at  a later time, Hobbes 
who had learned so much from Thucydides. The aspect of the matter 
in view was this: it is always men who will do the governing and men 
will naturally act for their own interest and private advantage. This is 
as mGch a reality in human affairs as is the existence of force, previously 
recognized, and again the solution is not to reduce one distinct thing 
to another but to harmonize them. Self-interest must be reconciled with 
the interest of the whole community, in some kind of identity, and neither 
one swallowed up in the other. The striving of men for their own good 
is legitimate and necessary but, inasmuch as there are so many different 
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en with such varying abilities and powers no one can really promote 
s own welfare without attention to, and even acting on behalf of the 
era1 welfare of the community in which he "operates," so to speak. 
overnment Stands Under Law and tlze Public Good. 
It  has developed in the inquiry that both a public end (the objective 
common good or the commonwealth) and a rule (justice) stand over 
e power of government. They are criteria by which acts of governance 
ged, There is a higher law and a good transcendent to the am- 
of rulers. Hence these are essentials of the connotation of re- 
rc-the supremacy of law for the State itself and the paramount con- 
rn for the commonwealth and all its members. 
ducation a Superior Function to Government. 
The subordinating of political power goes even further-but this one 
n barely mention here. Education has higher place and dignity in 
society of a republic than government. None of the above stipula- 
s for the good life-indeed even for survival-can be met in any de- 
untiI "every man, woman and child" is somehow imbued with the 
it of membership, concerned for the whole community, and persuaded 
he rule of law. In proportion as men think and feel themselves mem- 
s of one body and "care more for the community and for one an- 
er" ("The Phoenician Story," Republic, 414, 4151, the more disposed 
ey will be to govern their conduct from within and the more responsi- 
will they behave toward each other. The lessons in self-government 
hardest for the ones of political capacity, for such men "are guilty 
he greatest crimes from ambition" (Aristotle, Politics, 267a), and it 
is they especially who most need an education in what Montesquieu flatly 
called "self-renunciati~n."~ 
The Connotation of Republic. 
These are the minimum essentials of the systematic idea of repub- 
lic as set forth by Plato, and relevant to the purposes of our discussion 
-they are not regarded, however, as exhaustive of its meaning: A re- 
public is an order of society founded upon a sense of community and 
membership where men feel responsibility and are inwardly determined 
to exercise self-restraint out of regard for the whole State and for their 
fellows, and an order where a higher law than the laws of the State 
regulates all men and governments alike. Only in such a system can 
force and self-interest be combined with justice for all in the whole 
commonwealth and men go forward together into the natural competi- 
tions and enjoyments of a social existence without destroying one an- 
other and many possibilities of good in themselves and others. And the 
tenets of the republic are not a set of stipulations only for a pleasant 
and good living, they are the condition of survival. 
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8. Sovereignty: The Original Phase. 
The Raison d'Etre. 
Historically sovereignty is associated with the establishing of order out 
of the chaotic state of affairs in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe 
characterized by religious schism and civil dissension within and wars be. 
tween the various nations, Some authority was imperative, for the u~& 
versa1 authority, be it Church or Empire, had become ineffectual to con- 
trol the situation. The changing economy, too, demanded ever new law 
without delay and such law could not be that described by Aristotle which 
"derives all its strength from custom," and "requires long time to es- 
tablish."@ The answer to the imperative need was new practice and new 
theory in support of it, the theory of the sovereignty of the State. 
An Addendum to the Republic, 
In Jean Bodin's Six Books of the Republic the idea of sovereignty was 
introduced under the wing of that of republic: The supreme importance 
of the republic-idea was evident because in a time of such bitter, fan- 
atical, disrupting religious warfare and the contests of princes with rival 
armies, all elements in society needed to be reminded of the idea of the 
State as one commonwealth whose preservation and welfare are para- 
mount above all other interests and whose substance ought not to be 
wasted in internecine conflicts. The necessity of an authoritative rule of 
law was obvious. And the new design of authority was conceived to 
secure unity, order and law in each of the particular states, for hence- 
forth there had to be many Sovereignties, corresponding to  the territorial 
States. 
The First Intention: Absolute Power to Make Law. 
In Bodii's words, "sovereignty is *the absolute and perpetual power of 
the republic to dispose of the goods and persons of the entire State . . ."7 
The primary feature of this absolute sovereignty is that it is a power- 
with-right to make laws without the consent of the go~erned .~  
Power Absolute Yet with Limitations. 
Absolute though it be called, sovereignty in this historical connotation 
was no glorification of power unlimited: Bodin, Grotius and others who 
developed this first meaning intended their own theories as counterblasts 
at the amoral teachings of Machiavelli (Bodin, op cit., explicitly Chap. 
9 ) .  They conceived all the universe as under natural law which, as the 
law of God, stood supreme over all powers and principalities whatso- 
ever. The sovereign was absolute but under God, and absolute, there- 
fore, only in the sense that no other earthly agency within or beyond 
the national State had any "right" to intervene and restrain this sov- 
ereign power. But sovere i~ty  was also more particularly limited. It was 
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If a case of the property right under the law of nature, and were the 
rcise of it to weaken the validity of such natural-law property right 
would actually sap its own foundation. It was further limited de facto 
y the "law of nations" insofar as it was to the interest of other powers 
maintain that public law. Further still, and of dubious value, sov- 
eignty was limited by the moral law that required "good faith" and 
e observance of agreements and contracts. But vis-his private parties, 
ies, corporate bodies, etc., within the State, sovereignty was absolute 
at it had the right and authority to command action in accordance 
the sovereign will. 
Original Connotation Compatible with the Idea of Republic. 
thus introduced, in a milieu of respect for natural and moral law, 
of sovereignty was not yet contrary in any important sense to 
anclent idea of republic and it was proper of Bodin to present it 
e learned and political world as a version of the "republic" rele- 
to the times. But a contrariety was latent. Were the belief in natural 
to weaken or fade into thin air, the law of the sovereign State would 
absolutely supreme and unrestrained. To be sure, limited sovereignty, 
d by new "constitutional" law, might salve the republic idea and 
alues unless something happened further to exalt the power of the 
e so that it could readily override all moral compunction and the re- 
of the law of the constitution. 
9. Sovereignty: The Nationalistic Phase. 
sequence of developments must briefly be noted without time to 
e for or justify them in this presentation. 
Monarchy to Sovereignty of the People. 
n practice sovereignty in its first phase was associated almost ex- 
ively with monarchy and centralized government. In due season 
archical power was overthrown, The gloriole of supremacy passed from 
archs to the people: the sovereign-people substituted for the sover- 
-monarch. Was it the same power, or less or greater? 
reignty Unlimited. 
reater, we must say, and for several reasons or causes. The general 
ception of natural law itself as moral law sanctioned through religious 
f passed into the discard-the political world thought and acted with- 
ference to over-arching law. Moreover, sovereignty, when attached 
"people," gained a new, peculiar moral quality, being in a sense 
anscendent virtue available through the moral union of the wills of 
Thus sovereignty, in the new shift of weight, could gain upon law. 
sovereignty of the people would seem to need no limitation: it 
t be quite self-controlled. 
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The Theory of  Rousseall. 
So it was in theory, the theory of Rousseau. For Rousseau built two 
governing criteria into his doctrine of sovereignty. The "general w i p  
was truly so-and therefore properly designated sovereignty-because it 
was general in its source (the wills of people uniting themselves in spite 
of their diversity of interests) and general in its object, viz., the general 
good of the whole body, each one and all of the people. Sovereignty is 
real then only in acting according to law which obIiges and benefits 
every last one of the people equally. If that be so, sovereignty is ac- 
tually limited by a stipulation that it shall ever establish only "equal 
law." Thus law again is the criterion and the very mark by which it 
is determined whether or not a putative sovereign has true sovereignty. 
Some writers see in Rousseau's philosophy of politics only the absolute- 
ness and infallibility of the sovereign people, who thus seem to inherit 
the exemption from higher judgment expressed in the old maxim: "The 
King can do no wrong." It  should be noted, however, that the title of 
the relevant chapter in the Social Contract is in the form of a ques- 
tion: "Whether the general will can err?" 
The intention of Rousseau is very clear and plain in his last political 
work: 
T o  put the Law really above man is a problem of politics which I compare 
to that of squaring the circle in geometry. Solve that problem, and the govern- 
ment founded on the solution will be good and without abuse. But until then, 
rest assured that when you think you are making the Laws rule, it is really 
men who will do the ruling.' 
Here is the ancient vision of the republic together with the supremacy 
of law. But Rousseau's system has been taken only partially-and dan- 
gerously so-in the political views of the two centuries since he published, 
though it fared better in philosophy, thanks to Kant. 
Political Authority is Greatly Required in Modera Society. 
Modern life still requires, as was necessary in the sixteenth century, 
the extensive functioning of government in making positive laws to take 
care of the relations of men and their disparate and highly competitive 
interests in the industrial and commercial economy of our era. The 
continuing increase of the power of government is not simply to be de- 
plored or raiIed against to any effect. Political power must be avail- 
able to bring into working harmony the powerful interests made pos- 
sible by tremendous energies releascd through the scientific knowledge, the 
technology and the arts of organization in contemporary society. Call 
it sovereignty or something else, there must be legitimate authority with 
the power to cope with many divergent powers and bring them into order. 
The effective rule of Law is absolutely necessary. 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLIC 107 
10. The Critical Question of  our Time. 
Here is the critical juncture, and a question. Is sovereignty sovereign 
the sake of law? Or is it absolute, and is law only the dictate of the 
eign? The fate of the system called the "republic" depends on the 
trend of history in the very society of nations that so nobly call 
lves republics secms fatal to the very system whose name they take. 
tlonalism has swept sovereignty-absoIute into the saddle. The "wi!l 
people" could in the past be a tame, academic, harmless thing, 
e x in a formula, any people, anywhere. But nations have for 
hundred years become aware of their place and their time, their 
group history, their defeats, their victories, their oppressions, their 
ations-and their absolute separateness from other peoples. The "peo- 
is a suppositious, universal, homogeneous thing and one may imagine 
odd organized as a republic or a republic of republics, but when 
"nation" is the thing, it means this nation over against other nations; 
s jealous boundaries of interest, seeking national gain alone and 
ng and caring about the cost of ruining competitors, treating with 
other nations but abusing the profession of good faith only in order the 
easier to take advantage of them, The nations can do no wrong in their 
own eyes, and since they judge only by reference to themselves there 
is no public right or law. Such sovereignty is absolved from respect for 
any higher law. Politicians can rant without rebuke from their constitu- 
ency whose will they pretend to represent. "Who can flout the will of 
the people?" They quickly tell the people, too, what that will is. Thus lib- 
erty as well as law declines, when men do not have a will of their own 
and do not exercise it and let it be known. This is the dark scene of our 
time, with sovereignty in its nationalistic phase. 
Sovereignty has gained a new absoluteness and it has also developed 
a new sophistry with which to sustain itself. A new Socratic argument 
is necessary to expose the frauds, to re-present the connotation of re- 
public as it pertains to our circumstances, and to redeem liberty, the 
very liberty under law which the American nations have been particularly 
proud of in the past. Besides argument there must be action, enlightened 
by the discussion and guided by a politics which employs terms and ideas 
that are consistent or coherent, thus sustaining a policy which may ad- 
vance the cause of civilization among the nations. 
11. The Contrariety between Sovereignty and the Idea of Republic. 
or the present, the point of what has been said is this: that sov- 
ereignty which is really absolute in fact and by pretension is contrary to 
the political system of society which is denominated that of the republic. 
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Such unlimited and uncontroIlab1e sovereignty breaks away from the es. 
sential connection with right, from the harmony of power with justice, 
and from the subordination of government to law. Sovereignty in this 
mode is divested of both legal and moral quality and becomes nothing 
but sheer strength or power. It cannot claim therefore to be a right and 
to be respected as such. Such political power acknowledges no responsi- 
bility and it does not belong in a world that believes itself civilized, ac, 
cording to the criteria of civilization which have been profitably em. 
ployed ever since the Greeks. It is the very prevention of peace among 
nations, the peace for which men have yearned and have striven hard. 
They will have no peace until they settle scores with nationalistic soy- 
ereignty. Plainest of all is the handwriting on the wall, that sovereignty 
in its unruly nationalistic form is the supreme threat to human liberty, 
that liberty which has been the very condition of the knowledge, the 
science, the developed economic power which has produced possibilities 
of well-being for all peopIe greater than the world has ever known. The 
key to the future of liberty, law, international order and peace, is what 
one thinks and says and believes about such sovereignty. It is recom- 
mended here that we resume thinking seriously about the system of things 
which is symbolized by the term of "republic" and begin putting our ideas 
in order and making possible a practical diplomacy and politics which 
holds forth some hope for men of all nations. 
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